Public Interest Law

I. INTRODUCTION

A. QUICK NAVIGATION

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The stories of Daniel Roe, Steven Coke, and Gary Walp, illustrate a common plight of justice-involved veterans (JIV), those sitting in Texas jails, that this paper (the first to address the efficacy of a public interest law collaborative as a model for veterans treatment court reform on the legal representation of JIV’s) comprehensively and critically explores as a solution to problems faced by JIV’s who need and deserve to participate in a VTC program. In the tradition of social welfare policy, the solution has as one set of long-term goals to inject the voice of veterans into the VTC program policy and law debate and to debunk the negative stereotypes of veterans with mental health problems. More immediately, the goal is to reform an “essential characteristic” of the VTC program that is inefficient at “early identification and prompt placement of eligible [JIV’s] in the program,”[1] due to the impediment associated with court-appointed representation of indigent justice-involved veterans.[2]

This is hardly the first paper to address the plight of indigent defendants, either individually or as a class. Indeed, it has been very aptly stated that the “grave inadequacy of existing systems for serving the indigent is widely acknowledged and widely discussed. […] The claim that indigent defense solely needs reform is neither novel nor controversial.”[3]

While the myriads of reasons for the “grave inadequacy” and needs for reform of legal representation of indigents are beyond the scope of this paper, I have identified four significant reasons worth mentioning:

B. QUICK NAVIGATION

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As observed by Erin Everett, court-appointed lawyers are “burdened with impossible caseloads forcing them to juggle clients and priorities.”[4]

From the perspective of a less discernible “court community,” described by Ester Nir and Siyu Liu, “despite their opposing roles, defense attorneys often develop shared values and expectations with their ‘adversaries,’”[5] which, arguably, could cause court-appointed lawyers to intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, facilitate prosecutors with leveraging their plea-bargaining power “to suit their personal notions of justice and fairness.”[6]

Based on what Robert Toone characterized as an “absence of agency” in the indigent defendant-lawyer relationship, the price that poor defendants pay for receiving appointed legal representation is the loss of control over their defense.”[7]

As Barry Levin argued, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is “an elusive theory. To the typical defense attorney, PTSD evidence is difficult to comprehend.”[8] That sentiment was echoed by Miriam Goharo, who observed that “criminal defense attorneys have developed no […] universal trauma-informed professional norms or standards of representation.”[9]

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Role of Criminal Defense Attorneys

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II. CASE STUDY: STEVEN COKE

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Steven Coke, a U.S. Army combat veteran, was indicted in 2018 and again in 2020 for separate family-domestic violence offenses.[10] In both cases, represented by different court-appointed lawyers, Coke accepted plea bargain offers of three- and eight-year terms of probation; concurrent. Veterans treatment court was never mentioned, discussed, nor an option.

In 2023, at a hearing to revoke Coke’s probation in both cases for alleged violations, neither his new (third) court-appointed lawyer, prosecutor, nor a probation officer ever brought up or addressed Coke’s combat related PTSD, even though he testified at the hearing about his military service and deployment in Iraq. At best, his lawyer gave minimal reference to Coke coming out of the military with “some traumas” related to the death of his father while he was on active duty. Even then, the VTC program was never mentioned or discussed during the hearing. In fact, the probation officer testified that there were merely “some programs” available, but it would be difficult to recommend treatment for Coke because there was not enough proof that he had a drug problem, following which the prosecutor argued that Coke “didn’t have a problem.” The trial court revoked Coke’s probation and sentenced him to five years in prison. Had he had combat PTSD-informed advocacy, however, it might have helped him to avoid a prison sentence and, instead, might have helped the court fashion a sanction, as a modification of his probation, by requiring him to receive appropriate mental health treatment through the VTC program.

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Other factors complicating the representation of indigent JIV’s are the competing objectives of the defense attorney and the VTC program itself. As Toone argued, “the primary objective of representation are essentially the same in almost every case, regardless of charged offense, the defendant’s background, or even his actual guilt or innocence. That is, almost every defendant seeks to avoid charges, avoid conviction, and, when that is not possible, obtain the least severe punishment possible.”[11] On the other hand, the objective or goals of the VTC program are many, ranging from “crime and safety,” “reducing recidivism,” to “agency collaboration.”[12] These conflicting objectives become especially significant in light of the defense attorney’s professional duty to not “neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”[13] I.e., the criminal matter for which he was appointed or retained.

It bears emphasis at this point that this paper does not raise any quarrel with a JIV may needing the assistance of a defense attorney to make an informed choice between the VTC program and the traditional criminal justice process. There could be instances where the VTC program may not be in the JIV’s best interest based on any number of reasons or strategies determined by counsel. Even so, the important matter is that, “ultimately, it is up to the veteran charged with an offense to take advantage of the [VTC] program.”[14] The ultimate mission set forth in this paper is, thus, to ensure that no justice-involved veteran is left behind due to a lack of zealous advocacy on the part of court-appointed counsel when the veteran’s participation in the program would be in both the veteran’s and society’s best interests.

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III. EARLY IDENTIFICATION & PROMPT PLACEMENT OF ELIGIBLE JIV

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Judge Robert Russell described the “driving” mission of the VTC program to “successfully habilitate veterans by diverting them from the traditional criminal justice system and providing them with the tools they need in order to lead a productive and law-abiding life.”[15] As the story of Daniel Roe illustrates, in order for justice-involved veterans to benefit from the necessary tools or “access to the continuum of alcohol, controlled substance, mental health, and other related services,”[16] their early identification and prompt placement in the VTC program is crucial.[17]

Julie Baldwin’s 2015 national survey of VTC programs reported, “while VTCs appear to be identifying targets early, the majority of VTCs (88%) reported not having a set procedure for identification of veterans in contact with the criminal justice system.”[18].

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In Texas, county sheriffs are required to “investigate and verify the veteran status of each prisoner” using the Department of Veterans Affairs’ VRSS (Veterans Reentry Search Service) “or a similar service.”[19] Purportedly, to use Tarrant County as an example, the VTC program uses the VRSS or a similar system to identify justice-involved veterans who are “offense eligible” to participate in the program and conveys that information to the veterans’ attorneys.[20]

What is for certain, in practice, while a JIV’s referral to the VTC program may come from various sources,[21] the veteran’s ultimate access to the program depends on the defense attorney completing the application process and advocating on the veteran’s behalf.

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IV. JIV's “WILL GENERALLY RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE"

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In the criminal-therapeutic justice context,[22] veterans are “a niche population with unique needs.”[23] Predictably, “as our veteran population in the United States continues to rise, so too does the number of veterans with serious problems.”[24] As Levin puts it, when those problems lead to a criminal matter, the veteran “who finds himself in need of legal representation will generally receive ineffective assistance of counsel.”[25]

In the VTC context, it requires no strain of the imagination or elaboration to envision the lack of advocacy on the part of defense attorneys for JIVs participation in the VTC program when the role or requirement of a defense attorney before the eligibility consideration or determination stage is not expressly defined, much less mentioned, by the VTC statute.[26] In other words, while the statute clearly requires that both the attorney for the state and the trial court must “consent” to the JIV’s participation, the statute does not clarify any role of the defense attorney.

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What is known is:

“[I]f there has not yet been a disposition in the criminal case,” the VTC must ensure that the eligible JIV “is provided legal counsel before volunteering to proceed through the program and while participating in the program.”[27] and,
The VTC program uses “a non-adversarial approach involving prosecutors and defense attorneys to promote public safety and to protect the due process rights of program participants.”[28]

It bears emphasis that, in regards to the procedure of ensuring the appointment of counsel, the majority of defendants and pretrial detainees are indigent and, with the exception of those rare circumstances where a person is released from jail after paying a fine or posting bond, or having a private/retained attorney, and even more rare, self-representation, they would be represented by court-appointed counsel within 48-hours of their arrest,[29] and, thus, represented during the period in which there has not yet been a disposition in the criminal case. Moreso, under the VTC program’s “non-adversarial approach,” a defendant would not have the right to effective assistance of counsel during the VTC process.[30]

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V. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW

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Because a JIV’s eligibility to participate in the VTC program is based on the discretionary authority of the prosecutor and trial court, the program amounts to a state benefit, not a right. Fundamentally, this benefit is analogous to healthcare services insured by a plan that grants an insurance company “full and exclusive discretionary authority to make decisions regarding [consumer] eligibility for benefits.”[31]

Applying healthcare framework, about, the VTC program is seen as a form of governance regulation of a type of benefit tailored for the needs of justice-involved veterans and, as such, applicable to the context of the “classic period” of public interest law[32] when, during the 1960s and 1970s, various strategies emerged to address problems caused by governmental institutions and administrative agencies regulating social welfare programs.

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“Advocates for the poor, for example, sought social programs better tailored for the needs of their client groups. […] Law students and lawyers saw a role for expert advocates as representatives for underrepresented clients.”[33] In one area of social welfare effective advocacy grew out of consumer dissatisfaction with the quality of health care, costs, and the ensuing debate over managed care.[34] From this movement, health care collaborative consumer groups were formed, whose participation “allowed members to influence health care policy in a more effective way by influencing the agency and legislative decisions,”[35] and created “the ability to share information and knowledge,”[36] which produced education and training and the emergence of “best practices.”[37]

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VI. CONCEPTS OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE

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Katherine Wallet urged, “the current conception of access to justice must be redefined because it is missing a crucial component: an examination of the limitations of our current legal services model.”[38] This redefined conception requires “a reimaging of the role attorneys should play in working to achieve [access to justice for the poor].”[39] Part of the method argued by Wallet to achieving the reimaged role of attorneys is on a “fundamental level” with public interest law that employs efforts in “community organizing,” “interdisciplinary practices,” and “collaboration” with other disciplines,[40] which efforts align with the VTC program.[41][42] The benefit of these efforts includes a broader view of “systemic problems inherent in the legal system,” i.e., ineffective assistance of counsel and a JIV’s access to the VTC program and, thus, “allow for a better viewpoint to understand the systems that need to change.”[43]

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“better viewpoint,” highlighted by Kristy D’Angelo-Corker, is an accepted practice by the American Bar Association known as “limited scope representation,” which “has been gaining momentum as a more common practice throughout the United States.”[44] Basically, limited scope representation is “an alternative to traditional full-service representation. Instead of handling every task in a matter from start to finish, the lawyer handles only certain parts and the client remains responsible for the others.”[45] This practice is especially suited for pro bono representation[46] and, while more prevalent in the context of civil cases, it is argued that limited scope representation “should be promoted as beneficial in various areas of law, rather than the limited fields that it currently happens in, so that the pool of individuals reached can be expanded.”[47]

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VII. CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY VS. PRO BONO REPRESENTATION

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Margareth Elienne presents some empirical evidence that “theoretically” supports criminal defense attorneys serving in the role of a public interest lawyer; a “distinctive breed.”[48] That being said, it cannot be seriously expected that, while defense attorneys may fit into the framework of public interest law, they will be motivated to advocate for their veteran-clients’ participation in the VTC program in order to receive the continuum of care and services that they need and deserve, or to seek reform of the VTC system, to either change the law as it is written or applied.

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The reason being because, ultimately, public interest lawyering poses a real potential conflict between the cause pursued by the defense attorney on behalf of the justice-involved veteran and the “greater” socio-legal cause. “Criminal defense must, first and foremost, represent the interest of their clients,”[49] which is often the individual freedom of a particular defendant (without regard to guilt or innocence).”[50] As such, the defense attorney as a public interest lawyer can only hope that “her cause and the client’s interest will be compatible, if not identical.”[51]

C.

Not so with specialized pro bono representation focused on helping JIVs with matters solely related to the VTC program, which meets social welfare requirements both substantively and procedurally by addressing “real needs” of justice-involved veterans and ensuring “proper, fair implementation and access.”[52]

d.

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While the concept of providing veterans with pro bono legal assistance is not unheard of,[53] what differentiates the concept presented in this paper from the run-of-the-mill legal assistance for veterans is the real potential for benefiting both JIVs and pro bono lawyers by helping solve issues related to the VTC program and indigent representation of veterans by crafting techniques to “induce empathy for ostensibly unpopular causes and clients.”[54] As Martha Davis puts it, “[c]reating such empathy will not only attract more pro bono lawyers to the cause, but it will enhance the experience of both lawyers and clients engaged in pro bono work.”[55]

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VIII. CONCLUSION

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Using the principles and practices of public interest law, a new paradigm is needed as a model for veterans treatment court reform on legal representation of justice-involved veterans to ensure that no JIV is left behind. Once a JIV is identified in the criminal justice system and his or her interested in participating in the veterans treatment court program is made known, then a member of the State Bar of Texas, acting pro bono, should be allowed to step in and assume the role of the JIV’s advocate for the VTC program, a lawyer who is trained and skilled in Texas VTC law and policy and has knowledge of military and combat related mental health issues.

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History, practice, and ethics make the criminal defense attorney appointed to represent a JIV in his or her criminal matter unfeasible and inefficient to act in the traditional role of a public interest lawyer. Ethically, the duty of an appointed or retained criminal defense attorney is to not neglect the interest of their client in the criminal matter. The duties of a criminal defense attorney only encompass the defendant’s criminal case and not in a defendant’s participation in the VTC program. Only be an independent JIV-VTC attorney can properly advocate and represent a JIV in VTC matters, a lawyer who is not a part of the courtroom community in which the JIV’s criminal case is pending.

Case Study: Steven Coke

Case Study: Gary Walp

Recommendation #7

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IX. NOTES

1. See, Tex. Government Code, sec. 124.001(a)(3).

2. See, Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 282 n.68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)(“The majority of criminal defendants are indigent[.]”)(citation omitted); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent, Aberration or Systemic Problem? 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 739, 748 (2006)( “The vast majority of defendants in this country cannot afford to hire private counsel.”).

3. Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigation Reform of Indigent Defense,113 Harv. L. Rev. 2062, 2063-65 (2000); See, also, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 Yale L. J. 2150, 2152-53 (2013); The Problem of Adequate Representation of Indigent and Other Defendants in Criminal Cases, 36 F.R.D. 129 (1964).

4. Erin V. Everett, Salvation Lies Within: Why the Mississippi Supreme Can and Should Step In to Solve Mississippi’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 74 Miss. L. J. 213, 222 (2004).

5. Esther Nir & Siyu Liu, Defending Constitutional Rights in Imbalanced Courtrooms, 111 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 501, 507-08 (2001).

6. Keith A. Findley, et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of a Retrial: Bargaining Away Innocence, 2022 Wis. L. Rev. 533, 550 (2022).

7. Robert E. Toone, The Absence of Agency in Indigent Defense, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 25, 36 (2015). Notably, in conflict with the indigent defendant’s loss of control over his defense due to an absence of agency in the attorney-client relationship, is the constitutional recognition that court-appointed counsel is an “assistant,” and not the “master” over the defendant’s case. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). However, “[i]t is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas.” Id.

8. Barry L. Levin, In Defense of the Vietnam Veteran with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 46 Am. Jur. Trials, 441, § 41 (2023 Update)(originally published in 1993).

9. Miriam S. Goharo, In Defense of the Injured: How Trauma-Informed Criminal Defense Can Reform Sentencing, 45 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 33 (2018).

10. The State of Texas v. Steven Coke, Case Nos. 1533556 & 1637319; In the 297thCriminal District Court, Tarrant County, Texas.

11. Toone, The Absence of Agency in Indigent Defense, supra., at 36.

12. John Furman Wall, IV, The Veterans Treatment Court Program Act: South Carolina’s Opportunity to Provide Services for Those Who Have Served, 65 S.C. L. Rev. 879, 888 (2014).

13. See, Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.01(b) (2023).

14. Julie Marie Baldwin, Investigating the Programmatic Attack: A National Survey of Veterans Treatment Courts, 105 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 705, 722 (2015).

15. Judge Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive Approach, 35 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement,357, 364 (2009).

16. See, Tex. Government Code, §124.001(a)(4).

17. “Early identification of veterans entering the criminal justice system is an integral part of the process of placement in the [VTC] program. An arrest can be a traumatic event in a person's life. It creates an immediate crisis and can compel recognition of inappropriate behavior into the open, making denial for the need of treatment difficult for the veteran.” Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive Approach, supra., at 365-66. Accord, Judge Kevin S. Burke, Just What Made Drug Courts Successful? 36 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement, 39, 43 (2010)(“Action taken promptly after arrest is designed to take advantage of the shock of arrest felt by the defendant and to increase public confidence in the system.”; Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent and the Right to Counsel, 31 Am. J. Crim. L. 369, 396 (2004); LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 Am. J. Crim. L. 255, 299 (2001)(recognizing early identification of mentally ill defendants as a key factor associated with successful mental health diversion programs); and, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 Yale L. J. 827, 827 n.1 (1974).

18. Baldwin, Investigating the Programmatic Attack: A National Survey of Veterans Treatment Courts, supra., at 734.

19. Tex. Government Code, § 511.009(a)(17)(A).

20. An “essential characteristic” of the VTC program is the “integration of services in the processing of cases in the judicial system.” Tex. Government Code, §124.001(a)(1). While it is uncertain to what extent, if any, the program utilizes the VRSS or system, the stated goals in the Tarrant County VTC program brochure, “to find JIVs, assess their needs, [and] offer assistance[.]”

21. According to the Tarrant County VTC program brochure, access to the program includes referrals “from a variety of sources, including law enforcement, jail staff, judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors, mental health professionals, family, and friends.” (emphasis added).

22. For a comprehensive reading on therapeutic justice, see, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts, supra., at 261-62. Notably, “even though VTCs use ‘therapeutic justice’ approaches very similar to the problem-solving counterparts, the early data suggests VTCs work better.” Eric Merriam, Non-Uniform Justice: An Equal Protection Analysis of Veterans Treatment Courts’ Exclusionary Qualification Requirements, 84 Miss. L. J. 685, 733 (2015).

23. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive Approach, supra., at 363. “The uniqueness of veterans’ needs are said to derive from the impact of military service, in particular the traumatic and potentially criminogenic impact of combat. […] This trauma, in turn, imposes ‘costs,’ including substance addition, mental illness, homelessness, and unemployment, which then leads to criminal behavior.” Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 Geo. L. J. 1481, 1492, 1500-01 (2017).

24. Russell, supra., at 372.

25. Levin, In Defense of the Vietnam Veteran with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, supra., at § 1.

26. See, Tex. Government Code, §124.002(a). The statute’s absence of explicit duties of a defense attorney is not phenomenal. In the 1970’s, defense counsel was not even mentioned in a congressional bill on pretrial diversion programs. See, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, supra., at 842.

27. Tex. Government Code, §124.003(a)(1).

28. Id., §124.001(a)(2).

29. See, Tex. Code of Criminal Procedure, arts. 15.17(a)(duty of magistrate to appoint counsel to indigent defendant within 48-hours after arrest); and 15.18(procedures for appointment of counsel upon arrest for out-of-county offenses).

30. Id., art. 1.051(a)(“A defendant in a criminal matter is entitled to be represented by counsel in an adversarial judicial proceeding.”)(emphasis added) . See, Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008)(“We have, for purposes of the right to counsel, pegged commencement to the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings.”)(internal quotation and citation omitted)(emphasis added); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)(“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”).

31. See, e.g., Ariana v. Humana Health Plan of Texas, 884 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2018).

32. For a comprehensive reading of public interest law, see, Catherine Albistan, Democracy, Civil Society, and Public Interest Law, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 187 (2018); Louise G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the “New Public Interest Law,” 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 455 (2005); and Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 207 (1976).

33. Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for Healthcare, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 575, 576-77 (2002).

34. Id., at 588-590.

35. Id., at 593.

36. Id., at 593-94.

37. Id., at 594.

38. Katherine S. Wallat, Reconceptualizing Access to Justice, 103 Marq. L. Rev. 581, 581 (2019).

39. Id., at 621.

40. Id., at 622-23.

41. See, Tex. Government Code, §§124.001(a)(9)(an essential characteristic of the VTC program is “continuing interdisciplinary education to promote effective program planning, implementation, and operations;”), and 124.001(a)(10)(“development of partnerships with public agencies and community organizations, including the United States Department of Veterans Affairs;”).

42. See, Judge Kevin S. Burke, Just What Made Drug Courts Successful? 36 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement

39, 45 (2010)(“Interdisciplinary education is encouraged in order to promote effective planning, implementation, and operations. Educating the attorneys involved in drug courts in the areas of psychology and addiction helps develop an understanding of the values, goals, and operating procedures of the treatment process.”).

43. Wallat, Reconceptualizing Access to Justice, supra., at 625.

44. Kristy D’Angelo-Corker, When Less Is More: The Limitedless Potential of Limited Scope Representation to Increase Access to Justice for Low-To-Moderate-Income Individuals, 103 Marq. L. Rev. 111, 113-14 (2019).

45. Id., at 116.

46. Id., at 116, 151-56.

47. Id., at 117.

48. Margareth Elienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1195, 1208, 1223 (2005).

49. Id., at 1227-28.

50. Id., at 1224.

51. Id., at 1228.

52. Martha F. Davis, Access and Justice: The Transformative Potential of Pro Bono Work, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 903, 903-04 (2004).

53. See, e.g., Allie Yang-Green, et al., Federal Government as Your Partner: What Advocates Should Know About Federal Resources for Veterans’ Legal Aid, 68 S.C. L. Rev. 209, 211 (2016). See, also, Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 312 & n.4 (1985)(recognizing that, for the purpose of presenting a VA claim, “various veterans’ organizations across the country make available trained service agents, free of charge, to assist claimants in developing and presenting their claims.”).

54. Davis, supra., at 923.

55. Id., at 924. “Social science research suggests that pro bono work itself, facilitated by empathetic lawyer-client relations, may influence pro bono lawyers to alter and expand their notions of justice. […] Pro bono work that begins and ends with providing access alone is little more than a band-aid that makes larger social problems. [Case in point, Steven Coke, whose case, while not involving pro bono representation, increasingly implicated larger social and legal problems with each repeated indigent representation by court-appointed lawyers.] If instead, pro bono representation meant a meaningful increase in both access and justice, you can be sure that clients would clamor for more lawyers, and the legal profession would be transformative and transformed.” Id., at 924-95.

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VETERANS TREATMENT COURT:

FEATURED ON THIS PAGE:

I. INTRODUCTION

A.

QUICK NAVIGATION

A.

B.

QUICK NAVIGATION

A.

QUICK NAVIGATION

QUICK NAVIGATION

QUICK NAVIGATION

II. CASE STUDY: STEVEN COKE

A.

A.

A.

B.

A.

A.

III. EARLY IDENTIFICATION & PROMPT PLACEMENT OF ELIGIBLE JIV

A.

A.

A.

B.

A.

A.

IV. JIV's “WILL GENERALLY RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE"

A.

A.

A.

B.

A.

A.

V. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW

A.

A.

A.

B.

A.

A.

VI. CONCEPTS OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE

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A.

A.

b.

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VII. CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY VS. PRO BONO REPRESENTATION

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A.

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B.

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A.

C.

C.

C.

d.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

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B.

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IX. NOTES

ORIGINAL WHITE PAPER

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